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On the Character of the Foreign Trade of
the People’s Republic of China in the Period
1949–1969
Aleš Skrˇivan Jr.
Foreign trade was one of the first areas of the Chinese economy which passed com-
pletely under the state control after the establishment of the Communist regime in
China. The Beijing government started to build a new institutional model inspired by
the Soviet experience. Like in other Communist states, the PRC’s foreign economic rela-
tions were strongly influenced by political and ideological factors determining not only
territorial structure of foreign trade. In general, foreign trade had a positive impact
on both the development of the industrial sector and the whole economy in the 1950s,
while in the 1960s the PRC’s foreign economic relations were naturally limited by polit-
ical tensions in relations with the Soviet bloc and also heavily impacted by the problems
of the domestic economy.
[Czechoslovakia; China; history of international trade]
When China was officially proclaimed a communist country in
October 1949, it was in a sorry state. The Middle Kingdom had ex-
perienced several decades marked by chaos and continuing disinte-
gration, as well as dramatic military conflicts. Logically, the long-
term unfavourable development had a negative effect on the under-
developed Chinese economy, which was plagued by many problems,
ranging from the lack of foodstuffs and corruption to hyperinflation.1
 Department of Economic History, Faculty of Economics, University of Economics in
Prague, Winston Churchill Square 4, 130 67 Prague 3, Czech Republic.
E-mail: ales.skrivan@vse.cz.
1 According to contemporary official Chinese statistics the communist leadership
managed to eliminate the inflation problem shortly after assuming power (in fact,
within two years). For more information, see Comprehensive Statistical Data and Mate-
rials on 50 Years of New China, China Statistics Press, Department of Comprehensive
Statistics of National Bureau of Statistics, Beijing 1999, p. 4.
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Practically everything indicated that the chances of the communists to
rapidly rid the Chinese economy of its problems was quite small and
that finding an efficient cure for the Chinese economy and ensuring
economic stability would not be an easy task for the new regime. The
communists were prepared theoretically, having to a limited extent
verified their theory even in practice, in the area they had ruled for
many years before the establishment of the PRC. On the other hand,
it was quite difficult to estimate what actual impact the leftist concept
would have on the Chinese economy in the long run and to determine
whether it would be sustainable at all.
Foreign trade was one of the first areas of the Chinese economy
which passed completely under the state control – the state monopoly
essentially came to life in the early 1950s. The People’s Republic of
China drew inspiration from the Soviet institutional model of foreign
trade, gradually building its own system of foreign trade manage-
ment, which was very similar to its Soviet model. The institutional
foundations of the new system were completed after the Moscow In-
ternational Economic Conference of 1952.2 The Ministry of Foreign
Trade (MFT) became the main administrative authority of this system.
It primarily fulfilled an administrative and monitoring role and its
possibilities to influence the overall character of foreign trade were
limited by a directive plan which was primarily elaborated by the
State Planning Committee.3
State-owned foreign trade companies, charged with the actual re-
alization of foreign trade, including the formulation and signing of
contracts, were very similar to the foreign trade companies (FTC) of
communist Czechoslovakia. Individual FTCs were bound primarily
by the one-year plans, elaborated by the MFT, and had strictly de-
fined authority, clearly specified groups of commodities for whose
export (or import) they were responsible. The FTCs’ headquarters
were based in Beijing and in the course of the 1950s they gradually
built their branches in other prominent cities of the PRC.4 One of the
FTCs’ core activities was the purchase of the present amount of do-
mestic production for export at fixed prices. Similarly, the amount of
2 K. WANG, Foreign Trade Policy and Apparatus of the People’s Republic of China,
in: Law and Contemporary Problems, 38, 2, 1973, p. 189.
3 A. SKRˇIVAN Jr., Hospodárˇské reformy v CˇLR v letech 1979–1989, Praha 2007, p. 49.
4 A. BOONE, The Foreign Trade of China, in: The China Quarterly, 11, 1962, p. 175.
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foreign goods they were supposed to purchase was predetermined.
Apart from concluding trade contracts they also engaged in informa-
tion and advisory activities. This system, however, also demonstrated
a clear disadvantage, which became evident particularly in trade rela-
tions with democratic countries and to a smaller extent also with com-
munist countries, and that was weak direct ties between the purchas-
ing and selling parties. Companies from Western countries were in
effect precluded from direct contact with Chinese producers (or recip-
ients), which along with other factors considerably complicated trade
with the PRC. Due to this system the flow of information in trade be-
tween the PRC and other communist countries was more complicated
and slower.5 The Council for the Promotion of International Trade be-
came another important body in the sphere of foreign trade relations.
Its primary tasks included organizing presentations of Chinese prod-
ucts abroad, publishing promotional and information brochures and
procuring certain legal acts, such as registering trademarks. Through
its subordinate bodies, the Council also ensured the arbitration of for-
eign trade disputes.6 The Council’s representatives were often in-
volved in negotiating specific trade deals, primarily with companies
from countries which did not maintain diplomatic relations with the
PRC.7
Undoubtedly, one of the first important tasks the new communist
government had to address and which was naturally related to the
PRC’s foreign trade strategy was the “clarification” of its relations
with other countries and establishment of the basic principles of its
foreign policy. Co-operation with the Soviet Union and its satellites
appeared as the only logical and realistic option. The Soviet Union
represented a politically kindred regime which had helped the Chi-
nese communists to achieve their final victory.8 On the other hand, re-
5 For example, from a Czechoslovak producer, through a Czechoslovak FTC, then a
Chinese FTC to a particular customer in the PRC.
6 For more information, see SKRˇIVAN Jr., pp. 49–50; Ch. HOWE, China’s Economy,
London 1978, pp. 139–143.
7 For information concerning contemporary activities of the Council for the Promotion
of Foreign Trade, see http://english.ccpit.org/ [2008–04–20]. For more information
on individual institutions active in foreign trade in the 1950s and 1960s, see WANG,
pp. 189–200.
8 For example, in rapid expansion of the areas controlled by the communists and in
procuring new weaponry for communist armies during the last stage of World War
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lations with the United States were tense for several reasons. In a way,
the victory of communists in China was a dangerous failure on part of
the USA, or better yet a failure of American policy in the Far East. In
communist China, the United States were, naturally, presented as the
main representative of its enemy, the capitalist world, which more-
over had been supporting Chiang Kai-shek for a long time.9 No other
options seemed realistic or offering advantages comparable to the al-
liance with the Soviet Union. Sino-Japanese relations had been consid-
erably disrupted by thewar and apart from that it was clear that Japan,
unlike in the interwar period, had not been acting as a regional power
and in some respects merely fulfilled the role of an “extended arm” of
the United States in the Far East.10 The option that China would re-
main neutral in the bipolar world of the era, was a utopian notion also
with regard to the economic needs of the new regime. Mao Zedong
was an advocate of the principle of the economic self-sufficiency of
the country (autarky) and of the related limited role of foreign trade.
On the other hand, he realized that this strategy should not be applied
at the time when the Chinese economy was still very weak and under-
developed.
At first glance, there was no serious obstacle that would hamper
establishment of close co-operation between the Soviet Union, the ex-
isting leader of the communist world, and the newly founded commu-
nist China. The reality was much more complicated. The relations be-
tween Stalin and Mao Zedong were far from ideal. Stalin considered
Mao an unpredictable and peculiar figure, possibly fearing the fact
that Mao would eventually become a second Tito. Mao Zedong, on
the other hand, suspected that Stalin wanted to make China an obedi-
ent satellite following instructions of its “older and more experienced
brother” from Moscow. The memories of Stalin’s support of Mao’s
II. For more information on the Soviet aid to Chinese communists and the increase of
the Soviet influence in China, see H. FEIS, The China Tangle, Princeton 1953, pp. 226
ff; A. KUBEK, How the Far East Was Lost, Chicago 1963, pp. 159 ff.
9 For more information on relations between the PRC and the USA, see D. SHAM-
BAUGH, Patterns of Interaction in Sino-American Relations, in: T.W. ROBINSON –
D. SHAMBAUGH (eds.), Chinese Foreign Policy, Theory and Practice, Oxford 1994, pp.
197–223.
10 For more information on relations between Japan and the PRC in the 1950s, see M.
NAKAJIMA, Foreign Relations: From the Korean War to the Bandung Line, in: The
Cambridge History of China (further only CHOC), 14/1, pp. 287–289.
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party competitors in the past still played an important role. Mao Ze-
dong was, however, aware of the fact that close co-operation with the
Soviet Union was a necessity and that he had no other real alterna-
tives. Due to this, as early as the summer of 1949, before the end of
the civil war and the declaration of the PRC, he delivered a speech
rejecting neutrality and declaring communist China’s resolve to “take
the side of the socialist bloc led by the Soviet Union”.11
In December 1949, Mao travelled to Moscow to negotiate a new
Sino-Soviet treaty which would establish the basic framework of fu-
ture co-operation, become the basis of Chinese foreign policy and,
last but not least, represent an agreement between two equal part-
ners, rather than being a document specifying the relations between
vassal and its lord. After very complicated and protracted negotia-
tions the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance
and other documents regulating economic co-operation were signed
in Moscow on February 14, 1950.12 The Treaty of Friendship, Alliance
and Mutual Assistance was basically drawn up as a military treaty pri-
marily oriented at the “disturbance of peace by Japan or its allies”.
At the same time, the Soviet Union undertook to, in the future, give
up its rights related to the existing Sino-Soviet administration of the
Chinese Changchun Railway13 and to withdraw its units from Port
11 P. SHORT, Mao, Praha 2001, p. 321. For more information on the controversial na-
ture of the relations between Stalin andMao Zedong see, for example, K. DURMAN,
Popely ješteˇ žhavé. Velká politika 1938–1991, Vol. 1, Sveˇtová válka a nukleární mír 1938–
1964, Praha 2004, pp. 304–306. On the other hand, some historians accentuate the
less problematic aspects of the relations between Mao and Stalin. They argue, for
example, that despite all disagreements they managed to create a well-functioning
alliance. Cf. S. GOLDSTEIN, Nationalism and Internationalism: Sino-Soviet Rela-
tions, in: ROBINSON – D. SHAMBAUGH (eds.), Chinese Foreign Policy, Theory and
Practice, Oxford 1994, pp. 232–235. For information on the foreign policy of the PRC
in the first years of the communist regime, see for example K. MÖLLER, Die Aussen-
politik der Volksrepublik China 1949–2004: Eine Einführung, Wiesbaden 2005, pp. 45–53.
12 Stalin was originally opposed to concluding this treaty. In his opinion, the treaty con-
cluded on August 14, 1945, signed by Molotov and Wang Shijie, Chiang Kai-shek’s
minister of foreign affairs, was to remain the cornerstone of Sino-Soviet relations as
it secured special rights in Manchuria for the Soviet Union. For more information on
the Sino-Soviet treaty of August 1945, see Ke-wen WANG, Modern China, An Ency-
clopedia of History, Culture, and Nationalism, New York – London 1998, pp. 319–320.
13 In effect, it occurred on December 31, 1952. The name Chinese Changchun Railway is
an aggregate name commonly applied to the Chinese Eastern and South Manchuria
Railways.
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Arthur. Communist China also gained a loan of USD 300 million,
distributed gradually over a five-year period. The promises of the
economic assistance provided by the Soviet Union caused the great-
est disappointment to Mao in particular as they clearly fell below his
original expectations.14
The somewhat controversial nature of Sino-Soviet relations became
manifest during the Korean War. In the first stage, at the time of
the North Korean army’s successes, the Beijing government was re-
strained, paying more attention to the dispatch of the seventh Ameri-
can fleet to the Taiwan Strait than to the events on the Korean Penin-
sula.15 However, the situation in Korea changed in September 1950
and North Korean units started to retreat. The threat of the North Ko-
rean regime’s fall would entail the appearance of the Beijing regime’s
enemies at the Sino-Korean border. Considering the circumstances,
Mao Zedong decided in favour of a direct intervention in the Korean
War, sending “volunteer” units to Korea.16 This was a difficult deci-
sion for Mao. A mere year after the declaration of the People’s Repub-
lic of China, China was drawn into an extensive conflict which had
a negative effect on the economic stabilization of the country, among
other things. Maowas disillusioned by the Soviet Union’s approach to
the Korean problem and considered its help in the fight against com-
mon enemies as insufficient. With bitterness Mao pointed out the fact
that the Soviet Union’s expenses related to the Korean War and a lim-
ited direct Soviet presence in this conflict were incomparable to the
burden the weak communist China was forced to bear.17
14 For more information on the Sino-Soviet negotiations concerning the Treaty of
Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance, see SHORT, pp. 322–324.
15 It was the American President Truman’s attempt to prevent a potential communist
invasion of Taiwan and the transfer of the Guomindang units to the mainland. I.
BAKEŠOVÁ – R. FÜRST – Z. HERˇMANOVÁ, Deˇjiny Taiwanu, Praha 2004, p. 102.
16 The UN called the PRC an aggressor and appealed to the Chinese units to withdraw.
On 1 February 1951, the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted Reso-
lution no. 498 concerning the Intervention of the Central People’s Government of
the People’s Republic of China in Korea. The text of the resolution is to be found at:
http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/5/ares5.htm [2017–08–30]. For more infor-
mation on the outset of the Korean conflict, see V. NÁLEVKA, Stalin, Mao Ce-tung,
Gottwald a zacˇátek války v Koreji, in: Dvacáté století / Twentieth century 2006, pp. 99–
114.
17 According to some estimates, the PRC’s expenses related to the Korean War totalled
USD 10 billion. NAKAJIMA, p. 278. For more information on the Korean War and
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After the Korean War, the Beijing government entered a new stage,
during which it could concentrate more on economic questions and
on the economic development of China, naturally using communist
methods. Stalin’s death marked a change in Sino-Soviet relations.
Khrushchev was not a dictator of the “Stalinist type”, which was re-
flected also in his approach to Beijing, primarily in his willingness to
allow greater concessions and in an effort to winMao’s trust. This new
strategy was also related to a considerable broadening of economic aid
to communist China, which markedly contributed to the more rapid
industrialization of the country. The Soviet Union had definitely be-
come China’s strategic partner in the transformation of the Chinese
economy to the socialist model. In the 1950s, the average share of
imports from the USSR contributed to almost one half of the overall
annual imports to the PRC, with machinery and equipment for recon-
structed or newly built industrial complexes forming a considerable
part of the Soviet deliveries. Approximately one fourth of the deliver-
ies from the USSR were financed by loans provided to the Chinese by
the Soviet Union.18 The Soviet Union was also clearly the largest sup-
plier of new technologies to the PRC. With Soviet participation, ap-
proximately 200 primarily larger projects were realized (particularly
steelworks, power plants and engineering enterprises), although not
all of them were also completed under Soviet supervision. The most
important projects realized with Soviet help during the first five-year
plan (1953–1957) included new steelworks in Wuhan, the reconstruc-
tion of steelworks in Anshan and the construction of the automobile
plant in Changchun. New industrial factories were usually not con-
structed in the more developed coastal centres but rather in new in-
dustrial inland centres, such as in Manchuria, Inner Mongolia and
Sichuan.19 Over 10,000 Soviet advisors and various specialists worked
in communist China with about 1,500 coming from other countries of
the Chinese participation in it, see B. CATCHPOLE, Korejská válka 1950–53, Praha
2003. For information on Sino-Soviet relations in the period from the end of World
War II until the end of the Korean War, see E.-M. STOLBERG, Stalin und die chinesi-
schen Kommunisten, 1945–1953, Stuttgart 1997.
18 Loans were provided primarily for the purchase of complete plant equipment; nat-
urally, some of the important loans were for the purchase of military material and
were of purely political and military nature. For more information, see J. G. GUR-
LEY, China’s Economy and the Maoist Strategy, New York 1976, pp. 163–164.
19 N. LARDY, Economic Recovery and the 1st Five-Year Plan, in: CHOC, 14/1, p. 177.
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the socialist bloc. Approximately 30,000 Chinese were sent to study
and train in the Soviet Union.20 Without Soviet participation, the in-
dustrialization of the PRCwould certainly have taken a different form,
or at least would have proceeded more slowly. According to some es-
timates over three-fourths of the machinery produced during the first
five-year plan were made on Soviet machines or using Soviet technol-
ogy and supervised by Soviet experts. Today, it is difficult to deter-
mine the exact volume of the financial resources flowing in the 1950s
from the USSR to the PRC. According to the later and rather ambigu-
ous proclamations by the Soviet government, in the 1950s the PRC
acquired loans totalling approximately USD 2 billion from the Soviet
Union.21 Soviet aid indisputably supported the rapid growth of the
Chinese economy. On the other hand, this co-operation caused con-
siderable dependence of the Chinese economy on the USSR.
The development of economic co-operation with the Soviet bloc as
well as the complicated relations with the democratic world22 was nat-
urally also reflected in the basic statistical overview of the PRC’s for-
eign trade. The 1950s witnessed relatively rapid growth in foreign
trade, albeit with certain fluctuations (Table 1). The entire foreign
trade policy principally emphasized the imports that would speed
up industrialization and support greater economic independence for
China in the future. Export, on the other hand, was primarily viewed
as necessary in order tomaintain an acceptable overall trade balance.23
20 Information on the number of projects realized in co-operation with the Soviets, the
number of the Soviet experts working in China and related information differ from
source to source. Cf. WANG, p. 173. C. RISKIN, China’s Political Economy, the Quest
for Development since 1949, Oxford 1987, pp. 74–77; J. K. FAIRBANK, The Great Chinese
Revolution 1800–1985, New York 1987, pp. 285–286.
21 NAKAJIMA, pp. 282–283.
22 The potential to trade with democratic countries in fact diminished even more af-
ter the UN appealed to individual countries to impose an embargo on supplies of
selected strategic commodities, such as weapons and crude oil to the PRC. The reso-
lution adopted by the General Assembly of the UN concerning Additional Measures
to Be Employed to Meet the Aggression in Korea, resolution no. 500 of May 18,
1951. The text of the resolution is to be found at: http://www.un.org/documents/
ga/res/5/ares5.htm [2007–08–30]. For more information on the trade regulation of
Western countries with communist China, see SHU Guang Zhang, Economic Cold
War, America’s Embargo Against China and the Sino-Soviet Alliance, 1949–1963, Stanford
2001; WANG, p. 187.
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Table 1. PRC’s Foreign Trade in 1950–195924
In billions of yuan In billions of USD
Year Export Import Balance Export Import Balance
1950 2.02 2.13 -0.11 0.55 0.58 -0.03
1951 2.42 3.53 -1.11 0.76 1.2 -0.44
1952 2.71 3.75 -1.04 0.82 1.12 -0.3
1953 3.48 4.61 -1.13 1.02 1.35 -0.33
1954 4.0 4.47 -0.47 1.15 1.29 -0.14
1955 4.87 6.11 -1.24 1.41 1.73 -0.32
1956 5.57 5.3 0.27 1.65 1.56 0.09
1957 5.45 5.0 0.45 1.6 1.5 0.1
1958 6.7 6.17 0.53 1.98 1.89 0.09
1959 7.81 7.12 0.69 2.26 2.12 0.14
total 45.03 48.19 -3.16 13.2 14.34 -1.14
The PRC mainly exported agricultural products and raw materials.
The PRC’s export potential was directly linked to harvest as well as
the increase in population, whose yearly numbers augmented in the
period of the first five-year plan, being above 2 % on average.25 As
concerns industries, the textile industry achieved the largest numbers,
second to the food industry in Chinese export.26 As has been sug-
gested, import into the PRC consisted primarily of machines and ma-
chinery (for information on the commodity structure of foreign trade,
see Table 2).
In 1950, non-communist countries had a large share, approximately
two thirds, of the PRC’s foreign trade. However, in the very next year,
the ratio changed; a major percentage of the PRC’s foreign trade was
with communist countries.27 Communist China favoured the Soviet
Union as its main trade partner, followed by its Eastern European
satellites. In the second half of the 1950s, the Sino-Soviet trade to-
talled approximately 50 % of the PRC’s total volume. Approximately
23 Feng-hwa Mah, The Foreign Trade of Mainland China, Edinburgh 1972, p. 2.
24 Source: Comprehensive Statistical Data and Materials, p. 60.
25 For more information, see M. PARKER, The Population Trends in Eastern Europe, the
USSR andMainland China (“Fertility Control in Communist Countries”), NewYork 1960,
pp. 197–208.
26 A. ECKSTEIN, Communist China’s Economic Growth and Foreign Trade, Implications for
U. S. Policy, New York 1966, pp. 114–115.
27 Estimates of the overall share of communist and non-communist countries vary. Cf.
BOONE, pp. 169–170.
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Table 2. Commodity Structure of the PRC’s Foreign Trade in 1955 and 1959 (%) 28
Commodity group Import Export
1955 1959 1955 1959
Foodstuffs, beverages and tobacco 2.2 0.3 32.8 26.2
Raw materials 11.1 13.4 36.9 24.4
Mineral fuels and lubricants 7.4 6.5 0.6 0.4
Vegetable and animal fats and oils 0.5 0.2 3.5 1.3
Chemicals 9.6 8.1 2.1 2.6
Manufacturing industry products 12.4 17.9 18.3 25.8
Engineering and transport devices 22.4 40.0 1.1 1.5
Other industrial products 2.6 2.2 1.8 12.9
Unclassified commodities 31.8 11.4 2.9 4.9
half of the Soviet export to communist China consisted of machines
and other equipment for industrial plants, with oil products becoming
another important commodity group with its share reaching 15 %.29
The GDR was the PRC’s second most important trade partner (with
a share of about 6 %) and Czechoslovakia came third (approximately
4.5 % share). The PRC’s trade balance in the first half of the 1950s
showed a negative balance as the growing import was financed not
only from the income from Chinese export, but largely also by Soviet
loans. In relation to repaying the debts to the Soviet Union, this trend
changed in the second half of the 1950s, resulting in a regular active
trade balance.30
As has been stated, Khrushchev’s rise to power resulted in the im-
provement of Sino-Soviet relations, which had a positive effect on the
development of the economic co-operation of both countries. In real-
ity, Mao Zedong and Khrushchev did not particularly like each other
and their rapprochement never exceeded the bounds of a calculated
alliance. Mao viewed Khrushchev with considerable contempt, in a
way even looked down on him, among other things for not being as
uncompromising a ruler of the Soviet Union as Stalin. In 1956, three
years after Stalin’s death, first more serious ruptures in relations be-
tween Beijing and Moscow reappeared.
28 SKRˇIVAN Jr., p. 50. Sources differ in the share of individual commodity groups, for
example as a result of different specifications of commodity groups. Cf. LARDY, p.
162. Source: A. ECKSTEIN, China’s Economic Revolution, Cambridge 1977, pp. 250
and 252.
29 Ibidem, p. 174.
30 For information on the PRC’s trade with the Soviet Union and its satellites in the
1950s see, for example, ECKSTEIN, pp. 145–161.
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On February 25, 1956, Khrushchev delivered a speech at the 20th
congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in
Moscow denouncing Stalin’s cult of personality. This event also had
a major impact outside the Soviet Union, in effect contributing to the
destabilization of the entire Soviet Empire. Despite having many ob-
jections to Stalin’s government, Mao Zedong denounced this step of
Khrushchev. It was probably motivated primarily by Mao’s concern
that the adoration of himmight end in a similar fashion. In November
1957, during his visit to Moscow, Mao was arrogant and disdainful,
thus openly demonstrating his dissatisfaction with the development
in the Soviet Union.31 Despite this, his visit in the end led to par-
tial mitigation of the disagreements between the two leaders. This
was primarily thanks to Khrushchev, who promised further aid to the
Chinese economy as well as technology for the production of nuclear
weapons. The intention to provide communist China with technology
for the production of nuclear weapons could appear as a rather risky
step. Mao’s extremist statements indicated that he did not fear the use
of nuclear weapons and an ensuing nuclear conflict as much as most
other politicians did.32
Mutual relations between the two countries sharply deteriorated at
the end of the 1950s. To a large extent this was caused byMao Zedong,
who embarked on a journey of economic experiments digressing con-
siderably from the Soviet model. At the same time, he abandoned the
existing more or less careful foreign policy, which led to the complica-
31 For interesting observations on this visit of Mao to Moscow, see LI Zhisui, Soukromý
život prˇedsedy Maa, Praha 1996, pp. 152–155.
32 For details, see SHORT, p. 372. In mid-1959, Khrushchev withdrew from the agree-
ment concerning “nuclear aid” to the PRC, however, the PRC still shortly after be-
came a nuclear power and in October 1964, performed its first trial nuclear explosion.
K. LIEBERTHAL, The Great Leap Forward and the Split in the Yenan Leadership, in:
CHOC, 14/1, pp. 312 and 352; A. S. WHITING, The Sino-Soviet Split, in: CHOC,
14/1, p. 538. The PRC tried to use the first test nuclear explosion as propaganda.
For example, the Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in Prague informed
dozens of institutions and individuals in writing about this success. Information
for the First Secretary of the CC CPCz (The Central Committee of the Communist
Party of Czechoslovakia), comrade Novotný (signed by Col. Josef Kudrna, the first
deputy minister of interior), 2 November 1964, folder 90, part 2 – foreign relations,
office of the First Secretary of the CC CPCz, Antonín Novotný, Communist Party of
Czechoslovakia – Central Committee, collection no. 1261/0/44, National Archives,
Prague (hereinafter only NA).
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tion in the relations between the East and West. Khrushchev openly
criticized the Great Leap Forward, which he considered a completely
wrong strategy.33 Khrushchev was also provoked by the attacks of the
Chinese People’s Liberation Army against the Guomindang units on
Kinmen (Jinmen, Quemoy) and Matsu Islands, which could lead to
the worsening of relations between the Soviet Union and the United
States.34 Nor did Mao remain aloof. With his agreement, reports were
published in Beijing in April 1960, for example in the People’s Daily
(Renmin Ribao), on the 90th anniversary of Lenin’s birth, in which
Khrushchev was accused of modern revisionism. Tension between
Moscow and Beijing rapidly escalated. In June 1960, the schism was
completed when Khrushchev announced the withdrawal of the So-
viet experts from China. Extensive economic aid of the Soviet Union
thus virtually ceased overnight. China was also requested to settle its
obligations early. From the economic perspective, the Sino-Soviet split
occurred at the least suitable time; communist China found itself beset
by great problems, which were the result not only of the Great Leap
Forward, but also the inclement weather.
In the 1960s, communist China found itself in isolation and forced
to solve its problems by its own means, without extensive aid from
abroad. In a way and under rather curious circumstances, the PRC
returned to Mao’s original vision of the economic autarky. Relations
with the Soviet Union did not improve even after the fall of Khru-
shchev, as Brezhnev found it very difficult to find common ground
with Beijing as well. The turn of 1965 and 1966 saw the commence-
ment of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, an ideological cam-
paign, which acquired immense dimensions and resulted in a further
reduction of ties between the PRC and the rest of the world.35 In the
33 TheGreat Leap Forwardwas a unique, radical and clearly unsuccessful development
policy, which among other things led to forming people’s communes, changes in
planning and expansion of steel production. For more information, see FAIRBANK,
pp. 296–315; F. WEMHEUER, Chinas „grosser Sprung nach vorne“ (1958–1961), Berlin
2004.
34 For more information on the attacks, see BAKEŠOVÁ – FÜRST – HERˇMANOVÁ,
pp. 113–114. The deterioration of the Sino-Soviet relations was also due to the Soviet
support of India during the Sino-Indian border dispute. For information on the Sino-
Indian border dispute, see N. MAXWELL, India’s China War, London 1970.
35 The chronology of the Cultural Revolution is not univocal. Usually, 1969 is consid-
ered the end of the Cultural Revolution as that was the year when the period of the
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second half of the 1960s, the PRC sunk into a deep crisis. The country
was in chaos caused by the violent actions of the Red Guards and the
controversies with Moscow grew into an open conflict. In early March
1969, clashes between the Chinese and Soviet units broke out on the
Ussuri and the conflict spread to other parts of the common border.
Beijing started talking about the threat of a Soviet nuclear attack.36
As has been suggested, at the turn of the 1950s and 1960s, commu-
nist China found itself mired in major economic problems, with the
development in the agricultural sector, where the first slump in pro-
duction occurred as early as 1959, becoming the most serious threat.
In 1960–1961, the volume of the agricultural production returned to
the level of the early 1950s.37 However, while in 1952, the PRC’s
population was 575 million, at the time of the outbreak of the de-
pression, it had to sustain a population augmented by a growth of
almost 100 million. The severe drop in agricultural production was
logically followed by a critical lack of food. The communist govern-
ment attempted to resolve this lack, at least partially, by more exten-
sive import of foodstuffs and primary agricultural products. While in
1959, the import of these commodities was at a record low, when the
PRC purchased foodstuffs and primary agricultural products for ap-
proximately USD 5 million abroad, which resulted in this commod-
ity group’s share in the PRC’s total import by mere 0.3 %, in 1962
the share of this commodity group increased to almost 40 %, totalling
harshest repressions and violent acts of the Red Guards ended. For more informa-
tion on the Cultural Revolution and its economic consequences, see E. AXILROD,
The Political Economy of the Chinese Revolution, Hong Kong 1972, pp. 341–451; D.H.
PERKINS, China’s Economic Policy and Performance, in: CHOC, 15/2, pp. 486–495.
36 A. SKRˇIVAN Jr., Teng Siao-pching. První muž Rˇíše strˇedu, Praha 1996, pp. 51–52. For
more information on the Sino-Soviet split, see B. T. KULIK, Sovetsko-kitaiskii raskol:
prichiny i posledstviya, Moscow 2000.
37 Available sources differ in data concerning the drop in agrarian production. The
most optimistic figures are presented by contemporary Chinese statistics from the
turn of the 1950s and 1960s, which were strongly influenced by falsified data from
the provinces and which cannot be considered relevant today. Western estimates
are more pessimistic as are the statistical overviews published recently in the PRC.
Cf. HOWE, p. 72; D.A. BARNETT, China and the World Food System, Washington D.
C. 1979, p. 37; Ten Great Years, Statistics of the Economic and Cultural Achievements of
the People’s Republic of China, Beijing 1960, p. 219; Comprehensive Statistical Data and
Materials, p. 31.
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Figure 1. The Development of the PRC’s Foreign Trade in the 1960s (Total of Overall
Import and Export)38
almost USD 330 million. Despite the increase in import of foodstuffs
and grains, the situation developed into famine in some regions,
which according to different estimates claimed the lives of 15–30 mil-
lion people. Today, the Chinese resources admit that in the period
of 1959–1961, the population decreased by approximately 13 million;
from 672 million to 659 million.39
The unfavourable development in agriculture led not only to the
growth of agricultural imports but also had other consequences for
foreign trade. Logically, the food deficit had a negative impact on agri-
cultural exports and thus also on the overall export performance of
the PRC. This limited export performance consequently led to grow-
ing problems with procuring sufficient means to finance import. As
has been suggested, communist China was forced to abandon its ex-
isting strategy of expanding foreign trade and to rely more on eco-
nomic self-sufficiency. In the early 1960s, the total volume of Chinese
foreign trade visibly decreased (Figure 1). Unlike the import of agri-
cultural products and artificial fertilizers, the import of most of other
commodities dropped. One of the most marked slumps occurred in
38 Source: Comprehensive Statistical Data and Materials, p. 60.
39 Comprehensive Statistical Data and Materials, p. 1.
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the commodity group ofmachines andmachinery.40 The revitalization
period of 1963–1965 led to a temporary increase in foreign trade, how-
ever this positive trend was disrupted in 1966 by the start of the Cul-
tural Revolution, which destabilized communist China and initiated
an extensive propaganda campaign against all things foreign. Foreign
trade stagnated until 1969. Considering the reduced need to purchase
foodstuffs and agricultural primary production abroad, the commod-
ity structure of Chinese import changed in the second half of the 1960s,
when the share as well as absolute volume of import of metallurgical
industry production (products from iron, steel as well as nonferrous
metals) grew considerably.41 On the other hand, the commodity struc-
ture of Chinese export did not change much.42
The Sino-Soviet split also caused changes in the territorial orienta-
tion of the PRC’s foreign trade as the Beijing government was forced to
co-operate more with non-communist countries. The PRC’s trade with
non-communist countries grew from approximately USD 1.4 billion in
1960 to over USD 2 billion in 1964.43 In 1963, the Soviet Union was
clearly the most important trade partner of the PRC, with an approxi-
mately 20 % share in the overall Chinese foreign trade. Two years later
it was surpassed by Hong Kong and Japan, with the latter becoming
an important supplier of complete plant equipment to the PRC in the
mid-1960s.44 Australia, Canada45 and Great Britain were also impor-
tant trade partners of the PRC, while the share of the Eastern European
countries was on the decrease.
40 An increase in agrarian import was achieved primarily at the cost of the consider-
ably limited import of machines and machinery. Cf. ECKSTEIN, Communist China’s
Economic Growth and Foreign Trade, p. 107, and T.N. SRINIVASAN, Agriculture and
Trade in China and India, San Francisco 1994, pp. 111–113.
41 Liang-Shing Fang, The Economy and Foreign Trade of China, in: Law and Contempo-
rary Problems, 38, 2, Trade with China 1973, p. 257.
42 For more information on commodity structure see ECKSTEIN, China’s Economic Rev-
olution, pp. 250 and 252.
43 Liang-Shing Fang, p. 256.
44 For more information on trade between the PRC and Japan in the 1960s, see, B.
GROSSMAN, International Economic Relations of the People’s Republic of China, in:
Asian Survey, 10, 9, 1970, pp. 796–797. Chinese export to Hong Kong was markedly
larger than import from Hong Kong. For more information on the PRC’s trade with
selected countries, see Table 3.
45 In the 1960s, Canada and Australia were primarily a significant source of grain for
communist China.
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Table 3. The PRC’s Trade with Selected Countries in 1960–1979 (Millions of USD)46
Year Hong Kongand Macau Japan USSR USA
import export import export import export import export
1960 17 198 0.2 — 845 819 — —
1961 12 190 14 22 292 536 — —
1962 9.7 228 42 32 211 491 — —
1963 8.2 301 64 65 194 407 — —
1964 16 404 161 141 134 312 — —
1965 18 462 262 192 186 222 — —
1966 16 581 334 269 165 140 — —
1967 12 497 304 234 56 55 — —
1968 11 532 335 205 59 33 — —
1969 13 575 382 201 27 27 — —
1970 14 604 583 224 24 23 — —
1971 12 659 594 281 68 81 — —
1972 20 892 627 412 117 133 3.3 9.6
1973 137 1,579 1,107 841 128 133 221 40
1974 109 1,603 1,983 1,143 145 155 373 103
1975 35 1,719 2,239 1,403 146 151 342 129
1976 29 1,817 1,817 1,223 246 168 161 156
1977 136 2,012 2,109 1,357 153 176 115 180
1978 75 2,668 3,105 1,719 208 230 721 271
1979 214 3,548 3,944 2,764 250 242 1,857 595
The GDR dropped to the sixth place and Czechoslovakia to seventh.
Unlike the commodity structure and territorial orientation, the foreign
trade balance did not experience considerable changes in the 1960s.
With the exception of 1960, it probably47 remained positive through-
out the 1960s although the surplus was not particularly prominent on
average.48 The PRCmostly showed an active balance in trade with de-
veloping countries. In total, trade with the Soviet Union throughout
the 1960s ended in surplus for communist China. On the other hand,
trade with Japan, Canada and Australia ended in deficit.49
46 Source: B. R. MITCHELL, International Historical Statistics, Africa, Asia & Oceania
1750–1993, London 1998, p. 587.
47 Some historians, although they are in the minority, believe that even further years
ended in negative balance. See, e. g., R. F. DERNBERGER, China’s Development Expe-
rience in Comparative Perspective, Cambridge, Mass. 1980, p. 131.
48 SKRˇIVAN Jr., Hospodárˇské reformy v CˇLR, p. 51. For more information on the foreign
trade balance see China Foreign Economic Statistical Yearbook 1999, p. 15.
49 Liang-Shing Fang, pp. 257–258.
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